Hudson and Samson:
The Roberts Court Confronts Privacy, Dignity, and the Fourth Amendment

John D. Castiglione*
“The principles . . . affect the very essence of constitutional liberty and security. They . . . apply
to all invasions on the part of the government and its employees of the sanctity of a man's home
and the privacies of life. It is not the breaking of his doors, and the rummaging of his drawers,
that constitutes the essence of the offence; but it is the invasion of his indefeasible right of
personal security, personal liberty, and private property.”1
“And what, other than civil suit, is the “effective deterrent” of a police [officer’s] violation of an
already-confessed suspect's Sixth Amendment rights by denying him prompt access to counsel?
Many would regard these violated rights as more significant than the right not to be intruded
upon in one's nightclothes . . .”2

Introduction

On July 1, 2005, the head marshal of the Supreme Court, Pamela Talkin, hand-delivered
a letter to the White House, a letter which contained just three sentences: 3 “Dear President
Bush: This is to inform you of my decision to retire from my position as an associate justice of
the Supreme Court of the United States effective upon the nomination and confirmation of my
successor. It has been a great privilege, indeed, to have served as a member of the court for 24
terms. I will leave it with enormous respect for the integrity of the court and its role under our

* The author currently practices at Latham & Watkins, LLP, in New York. I would like to thank all those who
contributed ideas and advice, especially Eric Waldo, currently serving as clerk to Judge Ann Aldrich of the Northern
District of Ohio. All errors are my own.
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constitutional structure. Sincerely, Sandra Day O'Connor.”4 And just like that, the career of the
first woman ever appointed to the Supreme Court came to a close.
It would be almost six months before Justice O’Connor actually left the Court.5 And yet,
within a matter of weeks of her departure, the Supreme Court would embark upon an
extraordinary process of curtailing generally accepted Fourth Amendment protections that
Justice O’Connor would almost surely have questioned, and in one case prevented. In Samson v.
California,6 decided just weeks after Justice O’Connor left, the Court determined that parolees
may be subjected to warrantless, suspicionless searches of their person and property, by any
government official, at any time.7 This 6-3 decision marked yet another chapter in the Court’s
recent history of declaring entire groups of individuals almost completely unprotected by the
Fourth Amendment. In Hudson v. Michigan8 - in what was a surprise to almost every observer the Court held that the Fourth Amendment does not mandate exclusion of evidence discovered
following knock-and-announce violations.9 What was most surprising about the Court’s decision
in Hudson was the majority’s willingness to call into question the central role of the exclusionary
rule to Fourth Amendment analysis. Coming in a 5-4 decision that was re-argued after Justice
O’Connor left the Court, Justice Alito, O’Connor’s replacement on the Court, supplied the
crucial fifth vote for the majority that O’Connor most probably would have withheld.10 And just
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like that, the continued vitality of one of the most well-established tenants of Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence – the exclusionary rule – was back in play almost a century after it was
established.11
Looking back at the 2005-2006 term, Professor Erwin Chemerinsky quipped that it was a
“mixed year” for criminal defendants.12 On the contrary, 2006 was actually quite a bad year not only for criminal defendants, but for anyone concerned with the steady tilt of the high court
away from a robust interpretation of the Fourth Amendment. Along with creating yet another
categorical exclusion of an entire class of individuals from meaningful Fourth Amendment
protection (that being parolees in Samson), 2006 inaugurated what promises to be a years-long
struggle within the Court for one of the core tenants of modern Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence: the exclusionary rule. More fundamentally, the first wave of Fourth Amendment
cases indicated clearly the Roberts Court’s thinking vis-à-vis the balance between personal
privacy and government power through law enforcement.
______________________________________________

In this article, I critique the change in course in criminal procedure chartered by the
Roberts Court in these decisions. In Part I, I will examine the Court’s decision in Samson,
arguing that the majority’s decision rests on unsupportable conceptions of efficacy of
suspicionless searches and role they play in effectuating the penological and rehabilitative goals
of parole. While few would argue that Samson is a particularly groundbreaking decision, it is
nonetheless notable for its overly broad conception of Fourth Amendment “reasonableness.” In
11
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Part II, I will examine the Court’s opening salvo against the exclusionary rule in Hudson. I
assert that Hudson was the first shot across the bow in what promises to be a long campaign by
the “conservative” block of the Court 13 to undermine, and ultimately overrule, the exclusionary
rule as a remedy for Fourth Amendment violations. In Part III, I will argue that the Court’s
decisions in these cases show a clear preference in the Court’s jurisprudence for the
government’s prerogatives in law enforcement, to the determinant of individuals’ legitimate
expectations of privacy, dignity, and autonomy. Both Samson and Hudson offer tantalizing clues
as to the new Roberts Court’s general theory of the balance of power, if you will, between the
state and the individual; a theory which promises to carry over into the “new generation” of
Fourth Amendment cases soon to come before the court.
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I. Categorical Exclusion of Parolees from Fourth Amendment Protection:
Samson v. California

A. Background – Probationer’s Rights Under the Fourth Amendment
In Samson v. California, 14 the Court held, 6-3, that the Fourth Amendment does not
prohibit a police officer from conducting a suspicionless search of a parolee. 15 The Court’s
decision in Samson was not a total surprise; the groundwork for the case had been laid just five
years earlier in United States v. Knights, where the Court endorsed a search regime for
probationers that required only reasonable suspicion of criminal activity in order to search.
1. United States v. Knights
The conceptual basis for the Court’s holding in Samson lies in United States v. Knights.16
In Knights, the Court upheld a California law providing that individuals on probation could be
stopped and searched at any time during the probationary period upon reasonable suspicion of
criminal activity, as opposed to the usual requirement of probable cause.17 The Court found that
such searches were “reasonable” under the Fourth Amendment.
Writing for a unanimous Court,18 Chief Justice Rehnquist held that probation was merely
one stop along a “continuum” of possible punishments facing a convicted criminal ranging from
“solitary confinement in a maximum-security facility to a few hours of mandatory community
service.”19 The Court used a privacy/governmental interest balancing test to assess the
reasonableness of the reduced-suspicion search. The Court found first that probationers, based
14

Samson v. California, 126 S. Ct. 2194 (2006).
Id. Justice Thomas delivered the opinion of the Court, joined by Chief Justice Roberts, Justice Alito, Justice
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Id. at 123.
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Justice Souter filed a one-paragraph concurrence dealing with a secondary issue in the case. Knights, 534
U.S. at 122-23 (Souter, J., concurring).
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Id. at 119, quoting Griffin v. Wisconson, 483 U.S. 868, 874 (1987) (Scalia, J.).
15
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on their position on the “continuum,” had a lowered expectation of privacy. Next, the Court held
that it is “reasonable to conclude” that allowing searches of probationers on less than probable
cause of criminal activity would “further the two primary goals of probation - rehabilitation and
protecting society from future criminal violations.”20 As such, it is reasonable to subject
probationers to searches, and those searches need not be supported by probable cause (or a
warrant) like “typical” searches under the Fourth Amendment. Indeed, the Court specified that
the officer need not be that particular individual’s probation officer; rather, any officer with
knowledge of the individual’s status as a probationer could search without suspicion.21
Perhaps the most notable aspect of Knights was the Court’s holding that it did not need to
resort to “special needs” analysis to justify suspicionless searches of probationers. In Griffin v.
Wisconson,22 decided seven years prior to Knights, the Court held that warrantless searches of a
probationer’s home were permissible; the doctrinal hook, so to speak, was that the state law
authorizing the search fulfilled the “special need” of monitoring probationers.23 “Special needs”
was, by the time Griffin was decided, a well-established exception to the general
warrant/probable cause requirements of the Fourth Amendment.24 Under Knights, however, the
Court abandoned the requirement of “special needs,”25 and held that a “general” Fourth
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Amendment reasonableness analysis was all that was needed to determine that probationers did
not enjoy full rights under the amendment, and could be searched at any time on reasonable
suspicion alone.26
B. Samson v. California
With this precedent less than five years old, the Court decided Samson v. California.27 In
Samson, another California law mandated that every prisoner eligible for release on parole “shall
agree in writing to be subject to search or seizure by a parole officer or other peace officer at any
time of the day or night.”28 Individualized suspicion of wrongdoing by the parolee was not a
prerequisite to search under the law. The facts of the case were quite similar to Knights;
petitioner Donald Samson, on parole following a conviction for felony possession of a firearm,
was walking down a street with a woman and child. He was approached by a local police
officer, who knew that Mr. Samson was on parole and believed him to be subject to an
outstanding warrant.29 After stopping Mr. Samson and confirming that he was not subject to an
outstanding warrant, the officer nevertheless searched Mr. Samson, based solely on Mr.
Samson’s status as a parolee. Of course, during the search, the officer discovered a cigarette box
in Mr. Samson’s pocket containing methamphetamine.30

probation restrictions. This dubious logic-that an opinion upholding the constitutionality of a particular search
implicitly holds unconstitutional any search that is not like it-runs contrary to Griffin 's express statement that its
“special needs” holding made it ‘unnecessary to consider whether’ warrantless searches of probationers were
otherwise reasonable within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.”).
26
Id. at 118-119.
27
Samson v. California, 126 S.Ct. 2194 (2006).
28
Id. at 2196, citing Cal. Penal Code Ann. §3067(a)(West 2000).
29
Id.
30
Id.
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At the suppression hearing, the trial court refused Mr. Samson’s motion to suppress the
drugs. Citing the California law,31 the court found that the search was proper even though the
arresting officer lacked any suspicion that Mr. Samson was engaged in criminal activity (apart
from the fact that he was a parolee). The jury convicted Mr. Samson, and he was sentenced to
seven years imprisonment.32 The California Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that a
suspicionless search of a parolee is “reasonable with in the meaning of the Fourth Amendment as
long as it is not arbitrary, capricious, or harassing.”33
1. The Majority Opinion
The Supreme Court granted certiorari, and affirmed. Writing for six members of the
Court,34 Justice Thomas began by invoking the “totality of the circumstances” test for
determining reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment. “Whether a search is reasonable is
determined by assessing, on the one hand, the degree to which it intrudes upon an individual’s
privacy and, on the other hand, the degree to which it is needed for the promotion of legitimate
governmental interests.”35 Pursuant to this approach, and relying heavily on Knights, Justice
Thomas found that, by virtue of their status as parolees on the “continuum” of state-imposed
punishments, parolees have a diminished expectation of privacy.36 In effect, parolees fall
somewhere between prisoners and probationers, and since neither of those groups enjoy a full
expectation of privacy under the Court’s precedents, neither do parolees.
Justice Thomas then looked to the substantial governmental interests in allowing
warrantless, suspicionless searches of parolees. “As the [high] recidivism rate [in the state of
31

Cal. Penal Code Ann. §3067(a)(West 2000) (requiring parolees to “‘to be subject to search or seizure by a
parole officer or other peace officer at any time of the day or night, with or without a search warrant and with or
without cause.”).
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36
Id. at 2198-99.
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California] demonstrates, most parolees are ill prepared to handle the pressures of reintegration.
Thus, most parolees require intense supervision.”37 This supervision, Justice Thomas asserted,
necessarily includes being exposed to suspicionless searches. “Imposing a reasonable suspicion
requirement, as urged by petitioner, would give parolees greater opportunity to anticipate
searches and conceal criminality.38 Because this would impeded the California legislature’s goal
of promoting re-integration, suspicionless searches are a “reasonable” response, and therefore
consistent with the Fourth Amendment.39
2. The Dissent
Writing for the dissent,40 Justice Stevens focused first on the fact that the majority
opinion marked a clear break from precedent. “What the Court sanctions today is an
unprecedented curtailment of liberty.”41 Justice Stevens noted that in the cases most heavily
relied on by the majority, Knights and Griffin, the Court had stopped short of sanctioning
completely suspicionless searches of probationers (a close corollary to parolees) by any and all
law enforcement officials. As to Griffin, Stevens noted that “at least the state in Griffin could in
good faith contend that its warrantless searches were supported by a special needs conceptually
distinct from law enforcement goals generally.”42 And as to Knights, Stevens noted that, under
that decision, reasonable suspicion was required to search probationers.43 In Samson, however,
the majority jettisons both the “special needs” requirement from Griffin and the “reasonable
suspicion” requirement from Knights. “Ignoring just how ‘closely guarded’ is that ‘category of

37

Samson, 126 S.Ct. at 2200.
Id. at 2200.
39
Id.at 2202.
40
Id. (Stevens, J., Breyer, J., and Souter, J., dissenting).
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Id. at 2203.
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Id.
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constitutionally permissible suspicionless searches’ the Court for the first time upholds an
entirely suspicionless search unsupported by any special need.”44
Justice Stevens then addressed the majority’s determination of parolee’s lowered
expectation of privacy. “Combining faulty syllogism with circular reasoning, the Court
concludes that parolees have no more legitimate expectation of privacy in their persons than do
prisoners. However superficially appealing that parity in treatment may seem, it . . . rests on an
intuition that fares poorly under scrutiny.”45 Justice Stevens continued:
Threaded throughout the Court’s reasoning is the suggestion that
deprivation of Fourth Amendment rights is part and parcel of any
convict’s punishment. If a person may be subject to random and
suspicionless searches in prison, the Court seems to assume, then
he cannot complain when he is subject to the same invasion
outside of prison, so long as the State can imprison him . . . [t]his
is a vestige of the long-discredited “act of grace” theory of
parole.46
Justice Stevens argued that the majority short-circuited a true Fourth Amendment analysis by
simply assuming that deprivation of Fourth Amendment rights is necessarily a component of
criminal punishment, without turning to “special needs” analysis, which had been the Court’s
chosen doctrinal method in Griffin, or hewing to the Court’s decision in Knights that at least
reasonable suspicion is required to search.
C. Critiquing Justice Thomas’ Opinion
1. The Court Assumes, Without Evidence or Analysis, That Suspicionless
Searches Deter Effective Monitoring of Parolees.

44
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The majority’s opinion in Samson is less than compelling. To begin, Justice Thomas
never adequately explains why requiring government officials to have individualized, objectively
reasonable suspicion before searching a parolee would handicap the government’s penological
and rehabilitative interests. While he asserts, uncontroversially, that “a State has an
overwhelming interest in supervising parolees” and that the “a State’s interest in reducing
recidivism and thereby promoting reintegration and positive citizenship . . . warrant[s] a privacy
intrusion that would otherwise not be tolerated under the Fourth Amendment,”47 he fails to
explain, or point to any evidence beyond the California legislatures’ passing of the law, why
requiring government officials to be able to point to at least some objective suspicion of
wrongdoing by the parolee would hinder these objectives.
While Justice Thomas is no doubt correct to assert that the legislature, not the courts, are
the appropriate forum for determining the “wisdom” of a particular policy (such as the need to
subject parolees to intense supervision), it is nevertheless inherent in the nature of the “totality of
the circumstances” inquiry for the Court to determine whether the legislature’s chosen method of
effectuating its policy choice is consistent with the Fourth Amendment’s command of
“reasonableness.” This means that the Court must make an attempt to determine whether the
methods chosen by the legislature (in this case, authorizing suspicionless searches) serve a
constitutionally permissible end (that all searches be “reasonable”). Simply stating that the
legislature has determined that “a requirement that searches be based on individualized suspicion
would undermine the State’s ability to effectively supervise parolees and protect the public”48 is
of no help when facing the constitutional question. In essence, Justice Thomas’s complete lack
of scrutiny of the legislature’s stated claims about the necessity of the search regime means that

47
48

Id. at 2200.
Samson, 126 S.Ct. at 2200.
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the legislature becomes the arbiter of whether its methods are permissible under the Fourth
Amendment; because the very act of the legislature passing the law means the state thinks it was
necessary - that makes it reasonable! The circularity of this argument is glaring.
As to the substance of his argument, Justice Thomas asserts that “[i]mposing a reasonable
suspicion requirement, as urged by petitioner, would give parolees greater opportunity to
anticipate searches and conceal criminality.”49 Unfortunately, Justice Thomas neglects to
explain (or offer any evidence) as to the basis upon which he makes this assertion. The Court
determined in Knights that probationers are entitled to reasonable suspicion of wrongdoing
before search.50 Why is the bar lower for parolees? Is it because they are more likely than
probationers to be engaging in criminal activity when searched? The Court declines to mention
whether parolees actually commit more crimes than probationers. Similarly, do parolees
generally hide evidence faster than probationers when police approach? Do parolees somehow
have the ability to sense police from farther away than probationers? If so, that might offer a
compelling reason to lower the suspicion bar. If not, why is it necessary to lower that bar before
a search can commence? Justice Thomas fails to specify. While Justice Thomas indicates that
the recidivism problem in California indicates that those convicted of crimes are more likely to
commit crimes again (thus making it more reasonable to search them without individualized
suspicion), it is difficult to see what role that plays in a Fourth Amendment analysis. All the
concept of a “high recidivism rate” indicates is that those who have been convicted of crimes are
more likely to be convicted a crime again; it emphatically does not mean that those who have
committed a crime are necessarily more likely to engage in criminal behavior than other

49
50

Id. at 2200.
United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 122 (2001).
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individuals.51 Indeed, propensity to commit criminal acts (which is really the concept Justice
Thomas is basing his argument on) is not generally seen as sufficient to support a search under
the Fourth Amendment; rather, it is the likelihood that an individual is currently committing a
criminal act that is determinative.52 The majority cites no evidence (outside its miscast argument
concerning recidivism) that parolees are more likely than anyone else to be committing a crime
at a given moment in time – the essential benchmark of whether a particular search is
reasonable.53
While Justice Thomas attempts to salvage his point by noting that parolees are, in theory,
deemed to have acted more harmfully than probationers,54 he fails to explain why this makes a
difference to the Fourth Amendment analysis. Is a search more “reasonable” because a “morebad actor” is targeted? Do parolees “deserve” less Fourth Amendment protection than others?55
If that is the logic to be used, then should not individuals with criminal records be subject to a
lower standard of suspicion than the rest of us? Surely former law breakers “deserve” less
protection than law abiding citizens. To most observers, though, the concept that some people

51

Justice Stevens touches on this argument in his Samson dissent. “The Court devotes a good portion of its
analysis to recidivism rates among parolees in California. One might question whether theses statistics . . . actually
demonstrate that the State’s interest is being served by the searches. That said, though, it has never been held
sufficient to justify suspicionless searches. If high crime rates were grounds enough for disposing of Fourth
Amendment protections, the Amendment long ago would have become a dead letter.” Samson, 126 S.Ct. at 2207.
52
If “propensity” to commit criminal acts were the standard by which Fourth Amendment reasonableness is
judged, then one might imagine that serial offenders who are no longer subject to any state-imposed punishment
should nevertheless be subject to a lowered-suspicion standard, since they could be said to be more likely to commit
crimes in the future. Such individuals are not, however, subject to any lowered level of Fourth Amendment
protection.
53
United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 560 (1976) (“[T]o accommodate public and private interests
some quantum of individualized suspicion is usually a prerequisite to a constitutional search and seizure.”).
54
Id. at 2201, citing United States v. Crawford, 372 F.3d 1048, 1077 (9th Cir. 2004).
55
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necessary for normal Fourth Amendment protections to be dispensed with. See Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517
(1984) (holding that traditional Fourth Amendment analysis in inapplicable to prisoners, because the recognition of
any privacy right is incompatible with the concept of incarceration and the needs of penal institutions.).
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are more “worthy” of Fourth Amendment protection than others is a constitutional non-starter, as
it should be.
2. The “Continuum” Theory of Privacy Remains Undeveloped by the
Court.
Implicit in the argument that parolees have a diminished expectation of privacy is the
idea that since parolees could have been denied parole by the state, the fact that they are granted
parole must mean that the state is free to impose any burden on the parolee that could have been
imposed in prison. “A California inmate may serve his parole period either in physical custody,
or elect to complete his sentence out of physical custody and subject to certain conditions. Under
the later option, the inmate remains in the legal custody of the California Department of
Corrections through the remainder of his term.”56 Leaving aside for the moment the fact that
Justice Thomas seems to intimate here that inmates actually have a meaningful choice in whether
or not to accept the terms of their parole, one can see how Justice Thomas simply assumes that
because parole falls somewhere between imprisonment and probation on the “continuum” of
punishments, it a priori means that a diminished expectation of privacy exists. While this
determination might in theory be reasonable, the fact is that the Court in Samson never bothers to
explain just why that is the case. Why do parolees necessarily have the same subjective
expectation of privacy as prisoners? The Court provides no answers. While one might assume
that parolees have the same, or less, expectation of privacy than probationers, one might also
assume that they have substantially more of an expectation than prisoners. Shouldn’t that mean
that at least some objective suspicion is necessary? The Court unhelpfully makes assumptions
and determinations about these relative levels of expectation of privacy without substantial
analysis. This lack of foundational analysis for a central proposition of the Court’s decision is
56

Id. at 2199
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unsatisfying to say the least, and undermines the majority’s assertion that Samson follows
logically from precedent.
3. Despite the Court’s Insistence, Samson Allows for Arbitrary and
Capricious Searches of Parolees.
Justice Thomas also fails to persuade when he attempts to insist that there are any
meaningful safeguards preventing arbitrary searches of parolees. One major concern raised by
petitioners was that the California law allowed officers to search on a mere whim, the ultimate
evil protected against by the Fourth Amendment.57 Justice Thomas felt that the law contained
adequate protection. “The concern that California’s suspicionless search system gives officers
unbridled discretion . . . is belied by California’s prohibition on ‘arbitrary, capricious, or
harassing’ searches.”58 The flaw in this reasoning is obvious. While one might imagine a
parolee bringing a successful claim for harassment under the law,59 it is hard to understand how a
parolee might bring a successful claim arguing that he or she has been subject to “arbitrary” or
“capricious” searches, given that Justice Thomas himself strongly intimates that the only real
criteria for conducting the search is that officer have knowledge that the individual was a
parolee.60 And so, Justice Thomas expects us to believe that the California law offer meaningful
protection against arbitrary or capricious searches, even though the only thing the government
would have to establish to support the search is that the officer knew the suspect was a parolee.
While one might conceive of a situation where an officer “accidentally” searches a parolee
57

Lasson, The History and Development of the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States
(1937) at 92-97 (noting that one of the primary justifications of the Revolution and the subsequent adoption of the
Fourth Amendment was the revulsion at the unlimited search power of government officials in the colonial period.).
58
Id. at 2201, citing Cal. Penal Code Ann. §3067(d) (West 2000) (“It is not the intent of the Legislature to
authorize law enforcement officers to conduct searches for the sole purpose of harassment.”).
59
Possible scenarios in which a parolee might bring a successful claim for harassment include situations where
repeated searches by police occur in a short time frame, or where police engage in extremely invasive or destructive
searches, or if the police were to make unnecessary searches at the workplace, etc.
60
Id. at 2202 (“Under California precedent, we note, an officer would not act reasonably in conducting a
suspicionless search absent knowledge that the person stopped for the search is a parolee.”).
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whom he doesn’t actually know to be a parolee (thus making the search “arbitrary” within
Justice Thomas’ definition, and making it illegal), such a search would be excluded regardless of
the searchee’s status – if the officer had no other suspicion factors to point to, the search would
be illegal as to anyone. Of course, if the officer did have other individualized search factors to
point to, the parolees’ parole status is irrelevant, and the search would permissible. Therefore, it
appears as though the Court sanctions “arbitrary and capricious” searches of parolees – in the
sense that officers can permissibly search parolees for any reason, or no reason at all, at any time
- as long as the government official knows of the searchee’s status as a parolee – a necessary
condition for implicating Samson’s holding in the first place. 61 While one might not object to
such a regime as a matter of preference or policy, it is not clear at all that such a regime comports
with the Fourth Amendment, by the Court’s own reasoning.
4. What happened to Special Needs Doctrine?
Ultimately, the most compelling – and simplest - argument for removing the usual Fourth
Amendment requirement of individualized suspicion62 is that parolees are, in effect, special
cases: because they have been sentenced to prison and (presumably) cannot reintegrate into
society successfully without intense supervision, searches on less-than-individualized suspicion
are necessary.63 Applying this doctrinal tool to the California law in Samson would have been
the most straightforward method of resolving the case. Normally, a finding by the Court that
61

“To say that [the] evils [of suspicionless searches] may be averted without that shield is, I fear, to pay lip
service to the end while withdrawing the means.” Id. at 2207 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
62
By “usual” requirement, I mean “most times” – as Justice Thomas points out in Samson, “[A]lthough this
Court has only sanctioned suspcionless searches in limited circumstances, mainly programmatic and special needs
searches, we have never held that these are the only limited circumstances in which searches absent individualized
suspicion could be “reasonable” under the Fourth Amendment.” Samson, 126 S. Ct. at 2201.
63
I am not convinced that this is necessarily a true proposition, as my argument immediately proceeding this
section indicates; I believe it is not at all clear that subjecting parolees to suspicionless searches is a necessary
element of an effective parole regime. As the petitioners in Samson argued, the majority of states, as well as the
federal government, require some level of suspicion for parolees searches. Samson, 126 S.Ct. at 2201.
Nevertheless, applying special needs analysis would have at least supplied the precedential hook that that majority
opinion lacked.
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“special needs” exist outside those of pure law-enforcement allows for an otherwise
impermissible curtailment of the full panoply of Fourth Amendment rights. The Court has not
been shy about recognizing special needs in other contexts.64 And yet, while Justice Thomas’s
argument seems tailor-made for special needs analysis – replete with references to the
penological and reintegrationist goals of the statute – the Court makes clear that “general” Fourth
Amendment doctrine was sufficient to determine that parolees may be subjected to suspicionless
searches.65 “Nor do we address whether California’s parole search condition is justified as a
special need under Griffin v. Wisconson, because our holding under general Fourth Amendment
principles renders such an examination unnecessary.”66
The question, then, is why the Court chose to abandon special needs analysis in this case.
While Justice Thomas asserts that because “normal” Fourth Amendment analysis is sufficient to
decide the case, just as it was in Knights,67 this seems too facile an explanation if taken on its
face.68 In this case, using special needs doctrine would have been the simplest ground on which
to decide the case. The Court could have held, uncontroversially, that managing parolees outside
of prison is, in essence, a unique undertaking, and that suspicionless searches were necessary to
64

See, e.g., Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 873 (1987) (permitting exceptions to the warrant and probablecause requirements for a search when “special needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement,” make those
requirements impracticable (quoting New Jersey v. T.L O., 469 U.S. 325, 351, (1985) (Blackmun, J., concurring));
Board of Education of Independent School District No. 92 of Pottawatomie County v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822 (2002)
(holding that policy requiring all students who participated in competitive extracurricular activities to submit to drug
testing was a reasonable means of furthering the school district's important interest in preventing and deterring drug
use among its schoolchildren, and therefore did not violate Fourth Amendment); Ferguson v. City of Charleston,
532 U.S. 67 (2001) (“Given that purpose and given the extensive involvement of law enforcement officials at every
stage of the policy, this case simply does not fit within the closely guarded category of ‘special needs.’”); City of
Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32 (2000) (“For example, we have upheld certain regimes of suspicionless
searches where the program was designed to serve “special needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement.”);
Vernonia School Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646 (1995) (upholding random drug testing of student-athletes under
“special needs” doctrine).
65
Samson, 126 S. Ct. at 2201.
66
Id. at 2199.
67
Knights, 534 U.S. at 117-118.
68
“We held in Knights, without recourse to Hudson – that the balance favored allowing the State to conduct
searches based on reasonable suspicion. Never before have we plunged below that floor absent a determination of
‘special needs.’” Samson, 126 S.Ct. at 2207 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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fulfill that need. This would have comported comfortably with the Court’s precedent, and
attracted at least one (Justice Stevens) and possibly all of the dissenters. Instead, the Court chose
to apply the general “reasonableness” test.
Two explanations are possible. First, it could be the case that the majority realized that
attempting to show how supsicionless searches are at all reasonably necessary to promote the
“special needs” of a parole regime was a tough sell, as it were, for the reasons outlined above.69
Far better to simply show that it is somehow generally “reasonable” to subject convicted
criminals to suspicionless searches, than to have to show how those searches actually promote
the state’s penological and rehabilitative interests.70 As the dissent argues, the nature of the
California law (allowing any law enforcement official to search any parolee at any time, without
suspicion of criminal activity) is far too broad to reasonably comport with the special need of
supervising parolees. “Had the State imposed as a condition of parole a requirement that
[prisoners] submit to random searched by his parole officer . . . the condition might have been
justified . . . under the special needs doctrine.”71 Similarly, had the parole board singled out
particularly dangerous or untrustworthy inmates for suspicionless searches, one might make the
argument that the program is tailored to advancing the specific need of supervising the individual
parolees that need the supervision the most. The fact that the majority eschews special needs
analysis indicates that the majority knew that a compelling “special needs” case possibly could
not, in fact, have been made.
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See section I(B)(4), supra.
“Special needs” doctrine allows for searches on less-than-full suspicion when legitimate needs “beyond the
normal need for law enforcement make the ··· probable-cause requirement impracticable.” O’Connor v. Ortega, 480
U.S. 709, 725 (1987), quoting New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 351 (1985) (Blackmun, J.). Searches conducted
pursuant to “special needs” must be reasonable in scope. National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489
U.S. 656, 667 (1989).
71
Samson, 126 S.Ct. at 2207.
70
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A second, more comprehensive, explanation is simply that the majority takes a very
limited view of the scope of Fourth Amendment vis-à-vis the individual’s right to privacy and
autonomy. In other words, the justices composing the majority in Samson did not need to resort
to special needs analysis because they believe that, as a general matter, the Fourth Amendment
provides relatively little protection to the individual when the government can articulate an
important-sounding reason to suspend the Amendment’s usual requirements. This unbalanced
balancing approach taken by the Court has been criticized as insufficiently protective of Fourth
Amendment rights, as well as needlessly complicating what should be a straightforward
application of special needs doctrine in most cases.72

II. Taking on the Exclusionary Rule: Hudson v. Michigan

Regardless of its flaws, Samson was a widely anticipated decision. Once Knights held
that probationers did not have full Fourth Amendment rights, it was only a matter of time before
the Court extended that basic rationale to parolees. The Court’s decision in Hudson v. Michigan,
however, caught much of the legal community by surprise. While there may have been clues,
here and there, that certain justices – Justice Scalia in particular73 - had been planning to call the
vitality of the exclusionary rule into question, the fact that the newly-composed Court moved so
decisively – and so quickly - following Justice O’Connor’s departure was surprising. In this
section, I will examine the Court’s decision in Hudson, including the dissent and Justice
Kennedy’s enigmatic concurrence. I will then critique Justice Scalia’s opinion for the majority,

72

See, e.g., Antoine McNamara, The “Special Needs” of Prison, Probation, and Parole, 82 N.Y.U. L. Rev.
____; (forthcoming April, 2007) (arguing that searches of probationers and parolees should be justified under the
special needs doctrine, and that alternative justifications are unsound and unnecessarily complex).
73
See n.96, infra.
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centering my comments on his cavalier endorsement of alternative remedies for knock-andannounce violations and the low bar set by the majority for the restriction of individual rights in
the face of law enforcement prerogatives.
A. Existing Exceptions to the Exclusionary Rule
Carving exceptions out of the exclusionary rule has been something of a pet project for
the Court since the rule was incorporated to the states in Mapp.74 Finding a consistent theme to
these carve-outs is difficult.75 Ostensibly, the Court applies the exclusionary rule only “where its
remedial objectives are thought most efficaciously served.”76 The test for making that
determination allows for the application of the rule only “where its deterrence benefits outweigh
its “substantial social costs.’”77 Whether the Court’s decisions hew closely to this formulation
are largely a function of one’s personal opinion; since Mapp, the Court has found the rule
inapplicable, for example, in civil trials,78 grand jury proceedings,79 when police reasonably rely
on a warrant unsupported by probable cause,80 when police reasonably rely on statutory
authority,81 when the evidence seized would have been inevitably discovered,82 when the illegal
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Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
Wesley MacNeil Oliver, Toward a Better Categorical Balance of The Costs and Benefits of the Exclusionary
Rule, 9 Buff. Crim. L. Rev. 201, 201 at n.1 (2005) (“I am certainly not the first to observe the irrational patchwork
covered by the exclusionary rule.”), citing Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107 Harv. L. Rev.
757 (1994) (arguing that the Court-created exceptions to the exclusionary rule are inconsistent and subject to
personnel shifts on the Court); Donald L. Doernberg, The Rights of the People: Reconciling Collective and
Individual Interests Under the Fourth Amendment, 58 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 259, 260 (1983) (exploring the “inconsistency
in the Court's treatment of Fourth Amendment rights and remedies,”).
76
United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974).
77
Bd. Of Probation and Parole v. Scott, 524 U.S. 357, 363 (1998) (quoting United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897,
907 (1984).
78
United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 459-60 (1976) ("[T]he judicially created exclusionary rule should not be
extended to forbid the use in the civil proceeding of one sovereign of evidence seized by a criminal law enforcement
agent of another sovereign.").
79
United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 349-52 (1974) (holding the exclusionary rule inapplicable to grand
jury proceedings).
80
United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 912-22 (1984) (adopting a good faith exception where officers
reasonably rely on a warrant later found to be unsupported by probable cause).
81
Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340, 349-55 (1987) (establishing a good faith exception to the Fourth Amendment
exclusionary rule where police rely on statutory authority).
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actions of police are sufficiently attenuated from the discovery of the evidence,83 and so forth.
What is clear, however, is that the Court had consistently upheld the central role of the
exclusionary rule in and of itself to Fourth Amendment analysis.
B. Hudson v. Michigan – The Frontal Assault on the Exclusionary Rule Begins
Given the Court’s history in this regard, a holding that an exclusionary remedy was not
available for knock-and-announce violations seems like just another log on the pile. Why, then,
should one be concerned about the Court’s decision in Hudson? I argue that the majority opinion
in Hudson betrayed a disturbingly hostile attitude by the conservative block of the new Roberts
Court to the very idea of the exclusionary remedy itself. While one might legitimately question
whether a precise fit exists between a knock-and-announce violation and an exclusionary remedy
in this particular case, the majority opinion in Hudson makes clear that the newly-composed
Court is beginning a serious re-evaluation of the exclusionary rule’s place in the constitutional
order, and offers clues as to a majority of the Court’s view of personal privacy vis-à-vis the
government’s interest in searches, surveillance, and general law enforcement.
1. Setting the Stage
It all started innocently enough; in late 2005, the Supreme Court agreed to hear the appeal
of People v. Hudson,84 a state case in which the Michigan Supreme Court, in direct contravention
of every other state and every federal circuit (save one), reaffirmed its decision that the
exclusionary rule was an inappropriate remedy for knock-and-announce violations.85 The
attorney who argued the case to the Supreme Court on behalf of the petitioner, David A. Moran,
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Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431 (1984) (establishing an exception to the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule
when the evidence illegally seized would have been inevitably discovered by authorities.)
83
Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963) (holding that confession of suspect that was sufficiently
attenuated from illegal arrest could be admitted at trial).
84
People v. Hudson, No. 246403, 2004 WL 1366947 (Mich. Ct. App. June 17, 2004), lv. app. den., 692 N.W.2d
385 (Mich. 2006).
85
Hudson, 2004 WL at *1, citing People v. Vasquez, 461 Mich. 235; 602 NW2d 376 (1999); People v. Stevens,
460 Mich. 626; 597 NW2d 53 (1999).
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has written that he felt strongly that this case would be nothing more than an opportunity for the
Court to rebuke the Michigan court’s outlier decision, while cleaning up some doctrinal loose
ends emerging from Wilson v. Arkansas,86 the case that “constitutionalized” the knock-andannounce rule less than ten years prior. 87
The facts of Hudson were simple enough; after obtaining a warrant authorizing a search
for drugs and firearms at the home of the defendant, Booker Hudson, the police arrived at his
home, announced their presence, and, after waiting just “three to five seconds,” entered Mr.
Hudson’s home.88 This was a clear knock-and-announce violation;89 indeed, Michigan
conceded as much at trial and throughout the appeal.90 Moreover, the crime for which Mr.
Hudson was eventually convicted, possession of crack cocaine, was “relatively minor.”91 All
told, this should have been a fairly straightforward case of applying Wilson and holding that the

86

Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927 (1995).
“I must confess that I really never saw it coming. When an attorney named Richard Korn telephoned me out
of the blue in February 2005 to ask if I would take a look at a case, People v. Hudson, that he had just lost in the
Michigan courts and assess whether it would make a good vehicle for challenging the Michigan Supreme Court's
1999 decision in People v. Stevens, I did not hesitate. After all, I had long been critical of Stevens, which had held
that exclusion of evidence was not an appropriate remedy for a Fourth Amendment knock-and-announce violation.
Stevens, in effect, gave the Michigan police carte blanche to violate the knock-and-announce rule, the ancient
common law requirement that the police must knock and generally allow residents to open their doors, thereby
sparing residents a forcible and terrifying police entry. The Michigan Supreme Court's decision seemed especially
vulnerable given that the United States Supreme Court had twice suppressed evidence seized after knock-andannounce violations, and had, just eleven years ago, unanimously held that the knock-and-announce rule was part of
the Fourth Amendment in Wilson v. Arkansas.
“Since the Michigan Supreme Court's refusal to suppress evidence seized after a knock-and-announce violation
was out of step with the U.S. Supreme Court's ruling in Wilson and with the rule followed in every other state and
federal circuit, except one, I felt confident that the Court, if it granted certiorari, would pull Michigan back into line.
My confidence was enhanced even further when the Court granted my certiorari petition just four days after it issued
Halbert v. Michigan, in which the Court reversed another Michigan Supreme Court decision that was radically out
of line with the position taken by other state and federal courts. While I certainly realized that it was possible I could
somehow lose Hudson, it never occurred to me that I could effectively kill an 800-year-old rule protecting personal
privacy and simultaneously put the entire exclusionary rule at risk.”
David A. Moran, The End of the Exclusionary Rule, Among Other Things: The Roberts Court Takes on the
Fourth Amendment. 2006 Cato Sup. Ct. Rev. 283, 295-296 (2006) (citations omitted).
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Hudson v. Michigan, 126 S.Ct. 2159, 2159 (2006).
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Id. at 2163
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Id.
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Hudson was found by the judge at his bench trial as having possessed five rocks of crack cocaine, and was
sentenced to probation. Moran, 2006 Cato Sup. Ct. Rev. at 298
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exclusionary rule applied to knock-and-announce violations, just as almost every court in the
country assumed it did.92
And at the first oral argument in January, 2006, that seemed to be the case. While Justice
Scalia floated the idea of §1983 being an adequate remedy to knock-and-announce violations, it
appeared that at least five (and possibly six) justices were supportive of the idea that the
exclusionary rule was the proper remedy. 93 As the fates would have it, though, shortly after oral
argument Justice O’Connor, a probable supporter of Mr. Hudson’s argument,94 resigned from the
Court. After Justice O’Connor was replaced on the bench by Samuel Alito, the Court ordered
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Prior to oral argument, Moran believed that the only interesting question in the case was whether the
Michigan Supreme Court had unduly expanded the “inevitable discovery” doctrine to encompass any situation in
which a knock-and-announce violation occurred. “Therefore, I thought Hudson was about two things: the
importance of maintaining an effective deterrent so that police would respect the knock-and-announce rule; and,
more abstractly, the proper scope of the inevitable discovery exception to the exclusionary rule. What I did not
realize was that the case would put the exclusionary rule itself into play.” Id. at 299.
93
It was clear that Justices Breyer, Ginsburg, Souter, and Stevens were supportive, and it appeared as though
Justice O’Connor, and perhaps Justice Kennedy were as well. For a transcript of the first oral argument, see 2006
WL 88656 (U.S.), 74 USLW 3422.
94
Justice O’Connor indicated her sympathy for Mr. Samson’s position at the first oral argument. From that
argument, an exchange between Justice O’Connor and David B. Salmons, Assistant to the Solicitor General,
appearing as amicus curiae on behalf of the Respondent:
MR. SALMONS : No, Your Honor. The knock- and-announce requirement is--we take no issue with that.
That is required by the fourth amendment. With regard-JUSTICE O'CONNOR: Well-MR. SALMONS: --to deterrence-JUSTICE O'CONNOR: --but in this very case you had an officer who said it was his regular policy -MR. SALMONS: Well-JUSTICE O'CONNOR: --never to knock and announce-MR. SALMONS: That's not-JUSTICE O'CONNOR: --to just go in. So, if the rule you propose is adopted, then every police officer in
America can follow the same policy. Is there no policy protecting the homeowner a little bit -MR. SALMONS: Of course the-JUSTICE O'CONNOR: --and the sanctity of the home-MR. SALMONS: Of course there is-JUSTICE O'CONNOR: --from this immediate - MR. SALMONS: --Your Honor, and that is not-JUSTICE O'CONNOR: --entry?
MR. SALMONS: --our position. And we, respectfully, would argue that that's not an appropriate way to
conduct the deterrence analysis. Even just on the terms of deterrence, we think that suppression here would
be a disproportionate remedy. And that's because, as this Court has repeatedly recognized, the officers
already have an incentive, inherent in the nature of the circumstances, to announce and delay some period
of time before entry.
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the case re-argued. It soon became clear at re-argument that Justice Scalia, with a new-found
ally, had grand plans in mind for Mr. Hudson. As Dean. Moran recounts:
At the re-argument . . . it became clear to me for the first time that the case
was no longer about the knock-and-announce rule or the inevitable
discovery doctrine when Justice Scalia asked me, in a series of questions,
why the threat of internal police discipline would not convince officers to
comply with the knock-and-announce rule. When I responded that such a
notion contradicts the very premise of Mapp v. Ohio, the seminal 1961 case
in which the Court extended the exclusionary rule to the states because
other remedies had proven worthless at deterring Fourth Amendment
violations, Justice Scalia replied, "Mapp was a long time ago. It was before
section 1983 was being used, wasn't it?"95
Just a few weeks later, the Court delivered its opinion. The result was unexpected, to
say the least.96
2. The Majority Opinion
Justice Scalia, joined by Justices Alito, Kennedy, Thomas, and Chief Justice Roberts,
began by noting that knock-and-announce rule itself was not at issue; rather, the only question
was one of remedy.97 Specifically, whether excluding evidence obtained in the home following a
knock-and-announce violation was appropriate.98 From the start, Justice Scalia made his lack of
enthusiasm for the exclusionary rule apparent. “Suppression of evidence . . . has always been
our last resort, not our first impulse . . . [we] have . . . repeatedly emphasized that the rule’s
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Moran, The End of the Exclusionary Rule,. supra n.87, at 299-300 (citations omitted).
See, e.g., M. K. Jamison, New Developments in Search and Seizure Law, 2006-APR Army Law. 9, 25 (2006)
(noting, in 2004, that the Court’s October, 2006 term will see a case (Hudson) dealing with the inevitable discovery
exception to the exclusionary rule). Needless to say, the Court had other ideas about what to do with Hudson.
97
Hudson, 126 S.Ct. at 2162-63.
98
Id.
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‘costly toll’ upon truth seeking and law enforcement objectives presents a high obstacle for those
urging its application.”99
The crux of the majority’s opinion dealt with the causal connection between a violation
and the application of the exclusionary rule. Noting that the exclusionary rule is not
automatically applied when evidence is obtained illegally because the causal connection “can be
too attenuated to justify exclusion,”100 the Court found that while violations of the warrant
requirement bear a direct relation to the discovery of evidence (because “citizens are entitled to
shield their persons houses, papers, and effects” until a valid warrant has been issued),101
violations of the knock-and-announce rule do not bear such a direct relationship, because the
purpose of the rule is the “protection of human life and limb,” both of the homeowner and the
entering agent.102
Turning next to the deterrence effect of the exclusionary rule in this context, Justice
Scalia notes that exclusion is appropriate only “where [its] deterrence benefits outweigh its
substantial social costs.”103 He finds the costs here considerable; not only would incriminating
evidence be lost, but “a constant flood of alleged failures to observe the rule” would deluge the
courts, offering some defendants a virtual “get out of jail free” card.104 As opposed to these high
costs, Justice Scalia argues that there is virtually no deterrence benefit to applying the rule, since
the requirement can be suspended whenever there is a reasonable possibility that evidence would
be destroyed or violence would erupt. Just because the Court applies an exclusionary remedy to
other violations in different contexts to deter illegal conduct does not mean that exclusion is a
99

Id. at 2163 (citations omitted).
Id. at 2164.
101
Id. at 2165, citing U.S. Const. amd. IV.
102
Id. Justice Scalia continues: “What the knock and announce rule has never protected, however, is one’s
interest in preventing the government from seeing or taking evidence described in a warrant. Since the interests that
were violated in his case have nothing to do with the seizure of evidence, the exclusionary rule is inapplicable.” Id.
103
Id.
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Id.
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valid remedy here: “[a]nd what, other than civil suit, is the “effective deterrent” of a police
[officer’s] violation of an already-confessed suspect's Sixth Amendment rights by denying him
prompt access to counsel? Many would regard these violated rights as more significant than the
right not to be intruded upon in one's nightclothes . . .”105
Addressing the elephant in the room, Justice Scalia argues that denying an
exclusionary remedy to knock-and-announce violations would not eviscerate the knockand-announce rule itself. Given the availability of §1983 remedies to constitutional
violations by state officers,106 §1988(b) authorization for plainitff’s attorney’s fees in
civil rights cases,107 and the prospect of “increasingly professional” police forces, the
majority asserts (although they admit they do not know for certain) that violations of the
knock-and-announce rule will be adequately deterred in the absence of an exclusionary
remedy.108
Justice Scalia concluded by tying Hudson to three cases previously decided by the Court
Segura v. United States,109 New York v. Harris,110 and United States v. Ramirez.111 These cases,
Justice Scalia argued, stood for the “proposition that an impermissible manner of entry [into the
home] does not necessarily trigger the exclusionary rule.”112 These cases, all involving some
sort of illegal police behavior during entry into the home, and where the evidence discovered was
105

Id. at 2167.
42 U.S.C. §1983 (2000).
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42 U.S.C. §1988(b)(2000).
108
Hudson, 126 S. Ct. at 2167-68.
109
Segura v. Harris, 468 U.S. 796 (1984) (holding that evidence obtained pursuant to an illegal entry into the
home by police need not be excluded if the police had sufficient information to obtain a warrant prior to the illegal
entry).
110
New York v. Harris, 495 U.S. 14 (1990) (holding that in the situation where police entered a home illegally
and arrested the suspect, that suspect’s statements at the stationhouse need not be excluded because the exclusionary
rule was “designed to protect the physical integrity of the home.”)
111
United States v. Ramirez, 523 U.S. 65 (1998) (discussing in dicta that property destruction during a home
search only mandates exclusion of recovered evidence when a sufficient causal relationship between the property
destruction and the discovery of the evidence exists). This portion of the opinion was joined only by Justice
Thomas, Justice Alito, and Chief Justice Roberts.
112
Hudson, 126 S.Ct. at 2169.
106

26

deemed admissible, were cited primarily to show that “the reason for a rule must govern the
sanctions for the rule’s violation.”113 In cases, like Hudson, where they do not, exclusion is not
proper.
3. Justice Kennedy’s Concurrence
Justice Kennedy provided the crucial fifth vote against the petitioner.114 He joined most
of Justice Scalia’s opinion (save for the portion citing Segura, Harris, and Ramirez as support for
the majority’s reasoning115), along with adding some thoughts of his own in concurrence.
To begin, Justice Kennedy offered assurances that the knock-and-announce rule was still
alive and well. “Two points should be underscored with respect to today’s decision. First, the
knock-and-announce requirement protects rights and expectations linked to ancient principles in
our constitutional order.”116 Next, he assured his audience that the exclusionary rule maintained
its central role in Fourth Amendment analysis. “Second, the continued operation of the
exclusionary rule, as settled and defined by our precedents, is not in doubt.”117 While Kennedy
noted the historic import of the knock requirement, he found that suppression was unjustified.
“Under our precedents, the causal link between a violation of the knock-and-announce
requirement and a later search is too attenuated to allow suppression.”118 While the dissent was
right to note the constitutional sanctity of the home, the fact that other civil remedies exist (such
as §1983 claims) and the fact that no “demonstrated pattern of knock-and-announce violations”
has been shown, Justice Kennedy argued that suppression is too strong a medicine for this
particular constitutional violation.119
113
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4. The Dissent
Writing for the dissent, Justice Breyer began by arguing that the Court’s holding
“represents a significant departure” from precedent.120 Clearly, it was undisputed that the Fourth
Amendment requires police to knock and announce their presence prior to executing a warrant in
the home.121 And so, given the Court’s reasoning in Wilson that “a court must ‘conside[r]’
whether officers complied with the knock-and-announce requirement ‘in assessing the
reasonableness of a search or seizure,’”122 and given Weeks and Mapp’s command that an
unreasonable search or seizure is an illegal constitutional search and seizure requiring exclusion
of evidence gleaned therefrom, Justice Breyer argued that an exclusionary remedy to knock-andannounce violations flows naturally from the Court’s precedent. “Why,” Justice Breyer asks, “is
[the] application of the exclusionary rule any less necessary here?”123
Turning next to the deterrence values of alternative remedies, Justice Breyer questioned
whether knock-and-announce violations will be under-deterred. “What reason is there to believe
that those remedies (such as private damages actions under 42 U.S.C. §1983), which the Court
found inadequate in Mapp, can adequately deter unconstitutional police behavior here?”124
Noting that the Court failed to cite a single case where a plaintiff had collected more than
nominal damages stemming from a violation,125 Justice Breyer criticized the Court for simply
assuming that civil claims will adequately protect the integrity of the knock-and-announce
without any supporting evidence. Critically, Justice Breyer admonished the Court for its overreliance on the idea of the “substantial social costs” incurred by applying the rule here. He
120

Hudson, 126 S. Ct. at 2171 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
See Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927, 927 (1995) (unanimously holding that the Fourth Amendment
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argued that the costs incurred are no different than the costs incurred by any application of the
exclusionary rule – evidence might be lost, and the guilty might go free.126 Justice Breyer
recognized the majority’s formulation of these costs as a broader argument against exclusion:
“The majority’s “substantial social costs” argument is an argument against the Fourth
Amendment’s exclusionary principle itself.”127
Finally, Justice Breyer criticizes the majority assertion that knock-and-announce
violations are not the “but for” causation of the discovery of evidence that typically leads to
exclusion. Besides the fact that this is a questionable empirical claim at best,128 Justice Breyer
argued that it is of limited relevance. “”[W]hether the interests underlying the knock-andannounce requirement are implicated in any given case is, in a sense, beside the point . . . where
a search is unlawful, the law insists upon suppression of the evidence consequently discovered,
even if that evidence or its possession has little or nothing to do with the reasons underlying the
constitutionality of the search.”129 In short, Justice Breyer believes that the general privacy
values underlying the Fourth Amendment are served by exclusion of evidence obtained pursuant
to illegal entry by police whether or not the actual discovery of evidence is causally related to the
knock-and-announce violation.130
C. Critiquing Hudson
Two main grounds of criticism arise from the majority’s opinion in Hudson. First is the
majority’s insistence that civil remedies will adequately protect individuals’ right under Wilson
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to be informed of police presence before entry. Second, the majority formulates a social
cost/deterrence benefit balancing test that will in theory almost never result in the application of
the exclusionary rule. Whether or not this is by design,131 the majority’s methodology has called
into question the continued vitality of the exclusionary rule as a remedy for Fourth Amendment
violations, and provides compelling evidence of the “conservative” block’s conception of
individual privacy and dignity vis-à-vis the interests of government and law enforcement.
1. Despite the Court’s Insistence, the Efficacy of Civil Suits to Remedy
Knock-and-Announce Violations is Effectively Nil
To begin, Justice Scalia’s assertion at oral argument and in his opinion that 42 U.S.C.
§1983 provides an adequate remedy for victims of knock-and-announce violations132 is dubious
at best. Justice Scalia effectively argues that, in the absence of an exclusionary remedy, every
time the police commit a knock-and-announce violation (an event one might expect to occur
more frequently following Hudson),133 the aggrieved party will have the knowledge, resources,
ability, and time to successfully bring a §1983 action in federal court. 134 The dissent in Hudson
recognized this reasoning as pure sophistry. “What reason is there to believe that those remedies
(such as private damages actions under 42 U.S.C. § 1983), which the Court found inadequate in
Mapp, can adequately deter unconstitutional police behavior here?”135 The dissent continues:
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I argue that the majority intentionally placed the continued vitality of the exclusionary rule in question, based
on the content of the opinion and Justice Scalia’s statements at oral argument. See section III(A), infra.
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Hudson, 126 S.Ct. at 2167.
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Given that Hudson removes one deterrent to violations (however effective one believes it to be), logic
suggests that this would have the effect of necessarily increasing the number of violations, at least in the short term.
Whether increased use of civil remedies will, in the long term, reduce the number of violations (as Justice Scalia
intimates, but can’t bring himself to fully argue) is obviously an open question, and will be for some time.
134
Hudson, 126 S.Ct. at 2167. (“Dollree Mapp could not turn to 42 U.S.C. §1983 for meaningful relief; Monroe
v. Pape,, which began the slow but steady expansion of that remedy, was decided the same Term as Mapp. It would
be another 17 years before the §1983 remedy was extended to reach the deep pockets of municipalities.” ). One
might be right to question Justice Scalia’s enthusiasm even for his proposed remedy, given his backhanded tone.
135
Samson, 126 S.Ct. at 2174 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing Kamisar, In Defense of the Search and Seizure
Exclusionary Rule, 26 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 119, 126-129 (2003) (arguing that “five decades of post- Weeks
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“T]he majority, like Michigan and the United States, has failed to cite a
single reported case in which a plaintiff has collected more than nominal
damages solely as a result of a knock-and-announce violation.” . . As
Justice Stewart, the author of a number of significant Fourth Amendment
opinions, explained, the deterrent effect of damage actions ‘can hardly be
said to be great,’ as such actions are ‘expensive, time-consuming, not
readily available, and rarely successful.’”136
Responding to this critique, Justice Scalia would have us believe that 42 U.S.C. §1988(b), which
provides for attorney’s fees for civil rights plaintiffs, provides an adequate incentive for attorneys
to pursue knock-and-announce claims in federal court.137 Justice Scalia notes that “[t]he number
of public-interest law firms and lawyers who specialize in civil rights grievances has greatly
expanded.”138 The insincerity of this argument is apparent. Even given the existence of 42
U.S.C. §1988(b), relatively few defendants would have the wherewithal and the resources to find
representation and bring such claims to their conclusion. Indeed, what would be the point? By
the time the civil case was tried or settled, the suspect in question would have been acquitted of
the charge or already released, or still be imprisoned. Does Justice Scalia believe that a civil suit
for nominal damages (the cost of a broken door, say) will be pursued by most (or even some) of
these individuals, especially if they are no longer incarcerated, even if they had the prospect of
representation? 139 It would hardly seem worth the trouble, given the slim prospects for

‘freedom’ from the inhibiting effect of the federal exclusionary rule failed to produce any meaningful alternative to
the exclusionary rule in any jurisdiction” and that there is no evidence that “times have changed” post- Mapp).
136
Id. at 2174, quoting Stewart, The Road to Mapp v. Ohio and Beyond: The Origins, Development and Future
of the Exclusionary Rule in Search-and-Seizure Cases, 83 Colum. L.Rev. 1365, 1388 (1983).
137
Id. at 2167.
138
Id.
139 See, e.g., Guido Calabresi, The Exclusionary Rule, 26 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 111 (2003) (noting plaintiffs’
high failure rate and theoretically high barriers to success in civil actions for exclusionary violations); William C.
Heffernan, The Fourth Amendment Exclusionary Rule as a Constitutional Remedy, 88 Geo. L.J. 799, 828 (2000)
(agreeing with the Court’s finding in Leon that once a Fourth Amendment violation has occurred, the injury is
essentially irreversible and cannot easily be repaired).
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substantial recovery. Prospects for pro se plaintiffs are even dimmer.140 Justice Scalia’s
assertion that there are a “greatly expanded” number of public interest law firms who specialize
in civil rights grievances is equally un-compelling. Justice Scalia provides no evidence (nor
even argues) that there are sufficient numbers of attorneys available and willing to handle the
new civil suits that he claims will take the place of suppression motions, nor does he provide any
guidance as to whether the Court would be willing to re-establish an exclusionary remedy for
violations should that unknown number of civil-rights attorneys dip below a certain level - or
whether such a thing could even be measured accurately.
Similarly, putting aside for the moment the question of efficacy, the Court’s preference
for post hoc civil remedies undermines another main rationale for its decision – the danger of a
“flood” of knock-and-announce suppression claims. Justice Scalia argues that “[i]mposing that
massive remedy [exclusion] . . . would generate a flood” of claims for suppression.141 However,
most criminal cases that go to trial will include a suppression hearing anyway; there would seem
to be no great burden in allowing knock-and-announce claims to be brought alongside other
suppression claims a defendant may have.142 Given that - until Hudson - it had been assumed by
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Michele G. Hermann, The Invisible Litigant: An Inside View of Pro Se Actions in Federal Court, 47 N.Y.U.
L. Rev. 157, 176-187 (1972) (arguing that the vast majority of pro se prisoners are unable to state valid claims of
civil rights violations); Richard Rosen, Reflections on Innocence, 2006 Wis. L. Rev. 237, 285-86 (2006) (“Unable to
hire a lawyer or investigator, with no right to an appointed lawyer, the typical indigent, convicted, and innocent
person is unlikely to be able to uncover any evidence that would prove that he or she did not commit the crime. Even
if the wrongfully convicted person is fortunate to find evidence that casts doubt upon guilt, and can either initiate
litigation pro se or find a lawyer willing to take the case, the person still has to navigate the perilous waters of
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Indeed, Justice Scalia argues that determinations of whether knock-and-announce violations occurred are
inherently more complicated – requiring more “extensive litigation” – than determining whether, say, the warrant or
Miranda requirements have been fulfilled. “What constituted a “reasonable wait time’ in a particular case . . . .or
whether there was reasonable suspicion . . . is difficult for the trial court to determine and even more difficult for an
appellate court to review. Id. at 2166.
This argument borders on the absurd. Given the complex and often contradictory nature of the Court’s
other criminal procedure jurisprudence – especially its warrant and Miranda jurisprudence - it simply boggles the
mind that Justice Scalia actually believes that, for some reason, knock-and-announce motions are more than the
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most courts that an exclusionary remedy existed for knock-and-announce violations, and given
that the criminal courts have not been suffering from a deluge of knock-and-announce
suppression motions, Justice Scalia is clearly overstating the threat to judicial economy posed by
allowing exclusion. Indeed, Justice Scalia’s judicial economy argument seems especially
disingenuous given his full-blown endorsement of a §1983 remedy, a far more costly and time
consuming process than a straightforward suppression motion to the trial court.143
2. The Court’s Social Cost v. Deterrence Benefit Analysis Will Almost Never
Result in the Application of the Exclusionary Rule
More fundamentally, the Court engages in a social cost/deterrence benefit analysis that
can be expected to forego the application of the exclusionary rule in most circumstances. As to
the costs of imposing the rule, Justice Scalia warns that “[i]n addition to the grave adverse
consequences that exclusion of relevant evidence always entails,” including the release of
“dangerous criminals” into society and handicapping police in effectuating investigations and
arrest, “imposing that massive remedy . . . would generate a flood” of claims for suppression.144
On the other hand, deterrence benefits would be small: since there is not strong incentive for
police to violate the rule, and since civil remedies are available,145 “deterrence of knock-andannounce violations is not worth a lot.”146 Justice Scalia clearly signaled his broader intentions
at oral argument when he said that “Mapp was a long time ago. It was before section 1983 was

criminal court system can handle on a regular basis. One would be justified, I think, in questioning the sincerity of
Justice Scalia’s belief in this line of reasoning.
143
One might be justified in wondering whether the majority was cognizant of this contradiction, and chose to
argue it anyway, thus betraying their true enthusiasm for the knock-and-announce rule in and of itself.
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Hudson, 126 S. Ct. at 2165-66.
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being used, wasn't it?"147 Obviously, Justice Scalia (and, by extension, the four other justices
that signed onto the reasoning of his opinion) more or less agree with this sentiment.
The danger in the Court’s formulation of this balancing act is that it by its very
formulation favors the government interest over that of individual’s interest in autonomy,
privacy, and dignity – the essential values protected by the Fourth Amendment. One could
almost always successfully argue that reducing the risk of letting “dangerous criminals” go free,
or the reducing the risk of handicapping the ability of police to effectively investigate crime,
arrest criminals, and protect themselves is more important than maintaining one individual’s
interest in some amorphous conception of privacy. This is especially true when one is a
considering somewhat peripheral constitutional right like the knock-and-announce rule. This
“thumb on the scale” method of applying the exclusionary rule has been heavily criticized from
many quarters as being designed to prevent the application of the exclusionary rule in most
circumstances,148 as well as being guilty of false precision.149
3. The Court’s Assault on Exclusion Ignores the Judicial Integrity Rationale of
the Exclusionary Rule
Perhaps the most distressing aspect of the Court’s assault on the exclusionary rule is that
Hudson fails to address the higher-order purpose served by the exclusionary rule – judicial
integrity. Terry is worth quoting at length here:
147

Moran, The End of the Exclusionary Rule, supra n.87 at 299-300 (citations omitted).
See, e.g., Oliver, Toward a Better Categorical Balance of The Costs and Benefits of the Exclusionary Rule,
supra n.74 (describing the Court’s cost-benefit analysis as a “sham”); Jerry E. Norton, The Exclusionary Rule
Reconsidered: Restoring the Status Quo Ante, 33 Wake Forest L. Rev. 261, 261 (1998) (describing the Court’s test
as “flawed”); Yale Kamisar, Confessions, Search and Seizure, and the Rehnquist Court, 34 Tulsa L. Rev. 465, 487
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Jerry E. Norton, The Exclusionary Rule Reconsidered: Restoring the Status Quo Ante, 33 Wake Forest L.
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hunch.”).
148

34

“The [exclusionary rule] also serves another vital function-‘the imperative
of judicial integrity.’ Courts which sit under our Constitution cannot and
will not be made party to lawless invasions of the constitutional rights of
citizens by permitting unhindered governmental use of the fruits of such
invasions. Thus in our system evidentiary rulings provide the context in
which the judicial process of inclusion and exclusion approves some
conduct as comporting with constitutional guarantees and disapproves other
actions by state agents. A ruling admitting evidence in a criminal trial, we
recognize, has the necessary effect of legitimizing the conduct which
produced the evidence, while an

application of the exclusionary rule

withholds the constitutional imprimatur.”150
While the Hudson majority asserts that civil remedies will be sufficient to make victims
of constitutional violations whole - a dubious assertion at best151 - its focus on deterrence as the
sole justification for the exclusionary rule is unsatisfying. Judicial integrity is (or at least was) a
key rationale behind the Court’s recognition of the rule in Weeks and Mapp.152
Now, one would be justified in arguing that the “judicial integrity” train has long since
left the station when it comes to the exclusionary rule, given the myriad exceptions to the rule
carved out since Mapp.153 In none of those rule-limiting decisions does the Court seem
particularly troubled with the idea that the integrity of the judicial system is compromised when
evidenced seized in the wake of illegal police behavior is used against the defendant in one
fashion or another. If that is the case, why should one be concerned with Hudson? Isn’t this
150

Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 13-14 (1968), quoting Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 222 (1960).
See section II (B)(1), infra.
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fundamental rights.”); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (Clark, J.) (“But, as was said in Elkins, ‘there is another
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case just more of the same? There are two responses. First, simply because the Court has had a
history of carving exceptions to the exclusionary rule without paying adequate heed to this
fundamental concern is not an excuse for ignoring it in the future; the integrity of the trials and
the judicial process as a whole is central to the purpose of the rule. As Professor Norton has
suggested, “deterrence need not and should not be viewed as the only, or even the most
important, justification for the exclusion of evidence seized in violation of the Constitution.”154
Certainly, the idea of exclusion being necessary to legitimize criminal trials is a consistent theme
throughout the early exclusion cases.155
Second, the decision in Hudson is qualitatively different than the Court’s prior
recognition of exceptions to the rule in ways which seriously undermine the legitimacy of trials
in which evidence gleaned pursuant to a knock-and-announce violation is admitted. The removal
of an exclusionary remedy in these situations places the Court in the position of removing an
exclusionary remedy at trial for blatant, knowing constitutional violations by government
officials that lead directly to the discovery of evidence. This stands in contrast to the Court’s
prior carve-outs, which allowed for introduction of illegally obtained evidence in venues outside
the prosecution’s case-in-chief,156 where the violation and the discovery of evidence was in some
sense “separate” from the illegal activity of the officers,157 or where the officers had a good faith
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belief that they were acting in accordance with the law.158 In none of these situations could an
officer knowingly violate a suspect’s constitutional rights, yet use at trial evidence directly
obtained thereby. Now, after Hudson, they can. Take, for example, a situation where Officer is
about to enter Suspect’s home pursuant to a valid warrant. Suspect is engaging in some sort of
illegal activity that could be ceased, without leaving incriminating evidence, if given a few
second’s notice, within sight of the doorway. Officer knowingly chooses not to knock-andannounce, and enters the home. Suspect is seen by Officer engaging in the illegal activity. No
exceptions to the knock-and-announce rule apply. At trial, evidence of the illegal activity is
presented. Prior to Hudson, it was assumed that such evidence could not have been admitted,
because its discovery was the direct result of a constitutional violation. After Hudson, such
evidence is admissible in the prosecution’s case in chief. Never before has the Court sanctioned
the use at trial of evidence gleaned as a direct and knowing result of a violation of someone’s
rights. With Hudson, they have. While it seems unsavory to defend the application of the
exclusionary rule in a given instance by arguing that the proper application of the rule shields
illegal conduct from discovery, that is the natural byproduct of the rule: privacy, dignity, and
autonomy is deemed important enough to justify the possibility that evidence on occasion will be
lost and crimes will go unprotected. An honest defense of the rule must acknowledge this fact:
he exclusionary rule will seldom – but sometimes – protect criminals. And that is the way it
should be, if the goal of Fourth Amendment adjudication is the promotion of the legitimate
privacy and dignity interests of all individuals, and the maintenance of the integrity of the
judicial system.
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pursuant to a facially valid warrant is admissible, even if warrant later found to be unsupported by probable cause).
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4. Justice Kennedy’s Concurrence Supports the Notion that the
Exclusionary Rule is in Danger
Some might question whether Hudson truly marks the opening salvo in an effort to
repudiate the exclusionary rule. Isn’t it a bit reactionary to assume some grand scheme to
overturn such a fundamental rule based on one case alone? Justice Kennedy’s concurrence
provides clues that change is in the air. In his concurrence, Justice Kennedy took pains to
emphasize the historical importance – and the continued vitality - of the knock-and-announce
rule. And yet, he supported the reasoning of a majority opinion that removed what had almost
universally been assumed to be the proper remedy for a knock-and-announce violation exclusion.159 What message was Justice Kennedy trying to send by concurring?
One reading of Justice Kennedy’s concurrence supports the conclusion that he believes
that the “conservative” block of the Court (which he is often mentioned as a part of) has called
into question the continued vitality of the rule. Clearly, Justice Kennedy agreed with the
majority’s finding that the purposes of the knock-and-announce rule were not served by
excluding evidence seized from the home in the wake of a violation. “Under our precedents the
causal link between a violation of the knock-and-announce requirement and a later search is too
attenuated to allow suppression.”160 While he ruminates that a “demonstrated pattern of knockand-announce violations” might lead the Court to reconsider its decision in Hudson, he notes that
such a move would force the Court to fundamentally re-evaluate causation doctrine as applied to
Fourth Amendment analysis. He notes that the prospects of the Court undertaking such a seachange are a long shot, at best.161 The only portion of the Court’s opinion Justice Kennedy takes
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issue with, apparently, is the Court’s analysis of Segura, Harris, and Martinez, and yet even then
he simply discounts Justice Scalia’s analysis as having limited relevance.
The question, then, is why Justice Kennedy concurred. If he was in substantial
agreement with the Court’s conclusions, why not just sign on to the opinion? This is clearly not
a case of a “limiting” concurrence; Justice Kennedy makes clear that he adopts the majority’s
reasoning, and notwithstanding his somewhat off-handed remark that changing situations might
someday cause the Court to reconsider its decision (a position he essentially discounts in the next
sentence), the concurrence leaves no “wiggle room” for lower courts looking to soften the blow
of the majority’s opinion.
The only plausible answer is that Justice Kennedy concurred to make but one point:
“[T]he continued operation of the exclusionary rule, as settled and defined by our precedents, is
not in doubt.”162 Justice Kennedy wants to reassure his audience that the Court’s decision does
not call the vitality of the rule into question. This, of course, begs the question – if there really
was nothing to worry about, why does Justice Kennedy find it necessary to reassure us? If it
were clear from the Court’s reasoning that knock-and-announce violations were on a relatively
short, finite list of violations that do not carry a remedy of exclusion, there would be no reason
for him to concur. Most likely, Justice Kennedy recognizes the tone and substance of the
majority opinion for what they are – a bold indication by four justices that they believe that
application of the exclusionary rule is not appropriate for most Fourth Amendment violations,
and that the scope of the rule will be dramatically constricted as the new Court matures.163
While Justice Kennedy might someday be the deciding fifth vote that keeps such a fundamental
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Justice Kennedy’s own line of reasoning in Hudson almost assures that the exclusionary rule is slated for
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change at bay, one wonders whether Justice Kennedy could supply that vote while remaining
consistent with the reasoning he endorses in Hudson.164 Nevertheless, it is clear that Justice
Kennedy believes, whether he admits it or not, that the “conservative” block of the Court has
embarked upon a process of dramatically curtailing the exclusionary rule – a process he will be
in the position to ratify or reject.

III. Samson and Hudson Together: The Roberts Court Deemphasizes Personal Privacy,
Dignity, and Autonomy

Ultimately, the controversy over the particular remedy for a knock-and-announce
violation is of relatively minor importance the larger constitutional order. While one would be
justified in decrying the effective passing of an ancient tenant of security in the home,165 it seems
as though essentially allowing police to proceed into a suspect’s home without announcing their
presence and waiting a few seconds is a marginal, at best, curtailment of liberty. This is
especially true when one considers the widespread use of no-knock warrants and the broad
“exigent circumstances” exception to the knock-and-announce rule, both of which allows police
officers to enter a suspect’s home unannounced if they reasonably believe that announcing their
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See Hudson, 126 S. Ct. at 2171-72 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (decrying the majority’s decision to find no
exclusionary remedy to knock-and-announce violations under the Fourth Amendment, despite the roots of the
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presence will present a threat of violence or will lead to the destruction of evidence.166 Likewise,
in regards to the Court’s holding in Samson, the question of whether parolees have access to full
(or even just some) Fourth Amendment rights – in particular the right not to be searched without
cause - was something of a foregone conclusion given the Court’s precedent, and does not, at
first glance, seem to bode especially ill for the future of the republic.
The unspectacular nature of these rulings on the surface obscures their far-reaching
implications, only some of which are immediately obvious. What was most notable about
Hudson was the majority’s clear indication that the exclusionary rule is now up for grabs.
Whereas the Court before Hudson had essentially agreed with the fundamental premise of Mapp
– that “experience has taught that [exclusion] is the only effective deterrent to police misconduct
in the criminal context, and that without it the constitutional guarantee against unreasonable
searches and seizures would be a mere ‘form of words,’”167 and simply carved out exceptions to
that general rule where appropriate,168 the majority opinion in Hudson betrays a much more
fundamental opposition to the application of the rule in most criminal contexts. Similarly, while
one might ultimately agree with the Court’s conclusion in Samson that parolees should be subject
to searches on less than probable cause, the Court’s rather cavalier assumption that the
government’s interest in supervising parolees overrides the interest of the parolee to be searched
only when there is reason to believe some sort of criminal conduct is afoot is disturbing. This is
especially true given the fact that the majority’s opinion fails to argue compellingly that such
suspicionless searches actually serve the penological, rehabilitative, and reintegrationist goals of
parole.169
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Looking at these decisions as a whole, two conclusions arise. The first is that, in the
immediate wake of Justice O’Connor’s retirement, the continued vitality of the Fourth
Amendment exclusionary rule is clearly in doubt. The second conclusion, again growing
directly out of the Court’s change in personnel, is that there now is a majority on the Court that
will largely accept the idea that the State’s interest in law enforcement overrides the individual
interest in autonomy, dignity, and privacy in the Fourth Amendment context. While this
development has obvious implications in the “ordinary” criminal procedure context, as discussed
above, it potentially has more far reaching consequences for the “new generation” of search and
seizure cases, only some of which deal in substantial part with “classic” Fourth Amendment
issues. This “new generation” of cases will involve the Court in decisions on national security,
executive powers, detainee rights, and privacy in the Internet age
A. The Exclusionary Rule Is Now In Play
The first lesson to take from the Roberts Court’s first major Fourth Amendment cases is
that, at least in the short-to-middle term, the exclusionary rule has reached its apex and may well
be significantly contracted. Justice Scalia made clear at oral argument and in his opinion that
Hudson was about more than the potentially loose fit between knock-and-announce violations
and the deterrence rationale behind the exclusionary rule. After remarking at oral argument to
counsel for the petitioner that Mapp was outdated,170 Justice Scalia wrote in his opinion for the
majority that:
We cannot assume that exclusion in this context is necessary deterrence
simply because we found that it was necessary deterrence in different
contexts and long ago. That would be forcing the public today to pay for
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the sins and inadequacies of a legal regime that existed almost a half
century ago.171
If Justice Scalia simply believed that knock-and-announce violations did not fit comfortably with
an exclusionary remedy (a conviction he no doubt holds), there would be no reason to comment
upon the “sins” and “inadequacies” of the exclusionary regime as a whole.172 Clearly, Justice
Scalia is making a larger point about where he hopes to take the Court’s exclusionary
jurisprudence. This is not the first time he has intimated his intentions.173 The numbers seem to
work in Justice Scalia’s favor; Justice Thomas, his long-time ally, clearly agrees with this
sentiment. While it is difficult to speculate given their short tenures at this writing, it appears as
though the newest members of the Court, Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito, also agree with
this roll-back; if they did not, one would expect them to have joined Justice Kennedy in
concurrence. And so, Justice Kennedy, the wavering ally, would be the crucial fifth vote to
severely curtail or overturn exclusion. The prospects of Justice Kennedy becoming the deciding
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The irony of such a statement being made in an opinion authored by Justice Scalia is eye-opening. Justice
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856-857 (1989); see also Cass R. Sunstein, Burkean Minimalism, 105 Mich. L. Rev. 353, 357 (2006). To say that
the public should not be forced to “pay for the sins and inadequacies of a legal regime that existed almost a halfdecade ago” is to wonder why Justice Scalia so often “forces” the public to pay for the sins of old legal regimes in so
many other contexts, and why Justice Scalia abandoned his usual practice in the case of knock-and-announce
violations.
One might answer these queries by noting that Justice Scalia takes aim at the “legal regime” of exclusion
erected by the Court in Weeks and Mapp, not the legal regime surrounding the adoption of the Fourth Amendment
itself, which is the only legal regime inviolate to an originalist. In response, one might in turn argue that given the
patently inadequate remedies available for knock-and-announce violations in the wake of Hudson, see section II(C),
supra, the Court has essentially read the requirement (which predated the Fourth Amendment) out of the
Constitution – certainly a non-originalist action, bearing in mind that Justice Scalia himself claims not to dispute that
knock-and-announce is a constitutional requirement. Such a determination, of course, requires one to agree with the
idea that exclusion is the only truly effective remedy yet discovered for Fourth Amendment violations.
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fifth vote are outlined above.174 As of this writing, another Court vacancy filled under a
Republican president might well make moot Justice Kennedy’s participation in the Roberts
Court’s new Fourth Amendment course.
No longer can it be said, as it was by Professor Oliver just two years ago, that “[t]he
Court has used the opinions creating exceptions to the rule to obscure its continued support for
the rule that it has not abandoned.”175 Clearly, Hudson marks a shift in the Court’s jurisprudence
away from carving exceptions to the rule, towards questioning the basic validity of the rule itself.
While it is still early in the new Court’s tenure, the Roberts Court may yet prove correct Justice
Brennan’s then-premature proclamation that the exclusionary rule is soon to be a historical
footnote of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.176
B. Hudson and Samson Together – The Court Takes a Dim View of Personal
Privacy, Dignity, and Autonomy
More fundamentally, Samson and Hudson can be seen as natural outgrowths of the
“conservative” block’s view of the balance between constitutionally protected personal privacy
and the interests of government in law enforcement and social control. In Samson, the Court
found that society’s interest in supervising parolees outweighed any expectation of privacy,
dignity, or autonomy that parolees might subjectively or objectively have; in Hudson, the Court
found that society’s interest in effective law enforcement (through admission of evidence
discovered following an illegal entry into the home) outweighed the citizen’s right to be
informed of police presence before entry.
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See section II(C)(4), supra.
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Wesley MacNeil Oliver, Toward a Better Categorical Balance of The Costs and Benefits of the Exclusionary
Rule, 9 Buff. Crim. L. Rev. 201, 242 (2005).
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United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 365 (1974) (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("I am left with the uneasy
feeling that today's decision may signal that a majority of my colleagues have positioned themselves to reopen the
door still further and abandon altogether the exclusionary rule in search-and-seizure cases....").
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The troubling aspect of the Roberts Court’s decisions in these cases is not so much its
substantive determinations about the particular questions presented, although highly
questionable; rather, it is the fact that the Court’s formulations of the balancing test between
constitutionally protected autonomy and law enforcement ensure that in the predominance of
future cases of this sort, one can expect that the government’s interests will predominate over
those of the individual. In Samson, the Court determined that it was reasonable for the
government to essentially have the unfettered right to search any parolee at any time. This is
troubling, not because parolees should be free from intense oversight, but because it puts
government officials in the position of being able to search someone just because. In essence,
the Court held that since parolees need oversight, suspicionless searches are acceptable. The
conclusion, however, does not follow from the premise. If the Court in Samson had bothered to
attempt to tie such searches to the effective supervision of parolees, instead of simply assuming
the relationship to be self-evident, or had undertaken a good-faith special needs analysis, the
decision might be justifiable. It appears as though the reason the Court did not tie these together
is because it could not; there is at this point no reason to believe that suspicionless searches play
any significant role in the penological or rehabilitative goals of parole.177 Given that the Fourth
Amendment has long been construed as being primarily concerned with preventing searches
unless justified by probability of contemporaneous wrongdoing, this penchant for automatically
equating effective supervision with almost-unfettered official discretion to search is worrisome.
The same is true for the Court’s decision in Hudson; as the majority sees it, the
government’s ability to use evidence discovered following a blatant illegality trumps the
individual’s right to (sometimes) be notified before the police enter the home. To the extent one
believes the exclusionary rule to be the most effective method yet discovered for deterring
177

See section I(C)(1), supra.
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Fourth Amendment violations,178 the Court’s move away from the rule potentially opens the door
to a vast restructuring of the power balance between individuals and the state. Even those, like
Justice Scalia, who feel that the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule only protects the guilty179
(a crass characterization), should recognize that guilty people are of course still entitled to the
effective protection of their rights, and that the integrity of the criminal justice system is
denigrated when the government is allowed to retain the advantages of evidence seized
unconstitutionally.180 The idea that the government can knowingly violate an individual’s
constitutional rights and yet incur no meaningful penalty (such as the exclusion of evidence from
trial) is fundamentally antithetical to a constitutional order premised on individual liberty. Civil
remedies do not appear to offer sufficient disincentives for government actors to forgo
unconstitutional behavior when real damages are slight.181 Such questions of government power
and individual liberty – and the tradeoffs that must be made to accommodate the needs of both come to light dramatically in exclusionary rule cases, which is why such cases like Hudson
operate as effective barometers of the Court’s more fundamental inclinations.182
Hudson and Samson were the most stark examples in the Roberts Court’s first term of the
Justices’ predilections on these fundamental questions. The “minor” Fourth Amendment cases
decided by the new Court in its first term do nothing to undermine these observations. In United
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States v. Grubbs,183 a unanimous Court (argued before Justice Alito joined the bench) held that
“anticipatory warrants” are not per se unconstitutional, a holding in accord with every federal
circuit that had considered the question.184 In Brigham City v. Stuart, 185 the Court unanimously
held that police who witnessed a fight through a screen door could enter the home under the
“exigent circumstances” exception to the warrant requirement.186 In Georgia v. Randolph,187 the
Court held 5-4 that a warrantless search of the home is invalid as to a “physically present cooccupant” who refuses to consent to police entry.188
In Randolph, the need to properly weigh the ethereal concepts of individual privacy,
autonomy, and dignity with the concrete interest of government in law enforcement pervades
Justice Souter’s majority opinion. “Yes, we recognize the consenting tenant's interest as a citizen
in bringing criminal activity to light . . . [a]nd we understand a co-tenant's legitimate self-interest
in siding with the police to deflect suspicion raised by sharing quarters with a criminal . . . [b]ut
society can often have the benefit of these interests without relying on a theory of consent that
ignores an inhabitant's refusal to allow a warrantless search.”189 Once again, Justice Kennedy
was the deciding fifth vote, leaving the “conservative block” in this case to sign on to the
majority opinion joined by Justices Souter, Breyer, Ginsburg, and Stevens.
Chief Justice Roberts delivered a strong dissent, arguing that majority’s formulation of
society’s expectations of privacy is without compelling support, and that the risks to effective
law enforcement and prevention of domestic violence override the slight gains to privacy. He
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emphasized that privacy is curtailed once the information sought (for instance, the presence of
drugs in the home) has been disclosed to others, even if disclosed only in a co-habitory or
familial sense. “The Constitution, however, protects . . . privacy, and once privacy has been
shared, the shared information, documents, or places remain private only at the discretion of the
confidant.”190 Of interest here, Chief Justice Roberts explicitly plays out the “minor imposition,
severe consequences” balancing act in support of broader government power, just as the majority
did in Samson and Hudson: “Just as the source of the majority's rule is not privacy, so too the
interest it protects cannot reasonably be described as such . . . [w]hile the majority's rule protects
something random, its consequences are particularly severe.”191 He argues that while privacy in
shared living arrangements is already attenuated (because, for instance, a co-occupant can
effectively consent to search if the other is absent), the risks of evidence destruction and
domestic violence are high.192
Again, whether or not one agrees with the outcome in Randolph, what is clear from the
opinions is that the “conservative” block’s adheres to a balancing jurisprudence that deemphasizes individual privacy by juxtaposing supposedly minor impositions with great (even if
speculative) social harms. This fully comports with the decisions arising out of Hudson and
Samson.
C. Samson and Hudson: Implications Going Forward
Aside from the very real concerns about the Court’s doctrinal shift on privacy and
autonomy in the “regular” criminal context, Samson and Hudson offer clues about the Court’s
direction in the coming “new generation” of cases that go beyond the traditional boundaries of
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Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.193 Such emerging issues include the warrantless wiretapping
of American-based telephone users by national intelligence agencies,194 suspicionless searches of
individuals on public transportation,195 new methods of internet surveillance,196 the increasing
use of public surveillance cameras,197 data mining,198 and so forth. While many of these cases
will hinge on areas of law apart from pure Fourth Amendment reasonableness calculations, all of
them will require the Court (or lower courts looking for Supreme Court guidance on the issue) to
make fundamental determinations about the proper balance between personal privacy and
autonomy and the interests of government in law enforcement. Courts will have to make, even if
just implicitly, a determination about the values underlying the Fourth Amendment’s basic
command that all searches and seizures be “reasonable,” and will have to apply specific rules and
tests to make such determinations. Samson and Hudson offer a compelling preview of a majority
of the new Court’s attitude on the fundamental “reasonableness” calculus common to all these
issues. Given the Court’s formulation of the balancing test, the government’s interest will almost
always seem more compelling when the threat of violence or the loss of evidence is at stake,199
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and the imposition on a given individual (which oftentimes will be one who is clearly guilty of
something) will almost always seem small by comparison.
Going forward, petitioners seeking to challenge government actions using Fourth
Amendment reasonableness-type arguments will have to go above and beyond, as it were, to
show that the challenged intrusion outweighs the law enforcement benefits, because at least five
members of the high Court,200 including its newest members Justice Alito and Chief Justice
Roberts, can be expected to default to the position that the government’s law enforcement
interests usually trumps that of the individual’s interest in privacy, dignity, and autonomy. This
is especially true given that this “new generation” of cases will present issues of personal privacy
and dignity not well embedded in the constitutional tradition. Does a person give up the right not
to be filmed by government security cameras when he goes out into public? Are random
searches of commuters’ bags reasonable given the grave threat of terrorism? Does a person give
up the right not to be “data mined” if they voluntarily share information on the Internet? The
answers are not obvious given current Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. However, given the
conservative block’s formulation of the “reasonableness” inquiry in more “core” Fourth
Amendment cases like Samson, Hudson, and Randolph, one can expect that petitioners seeking
to expand the amendment’s protections into new realms will have a heavy, perhaps
insurmountable, burden.

Conclusion

and one whose application is "contrary to the idea of proportionality that is essential to the concept of justice.")
(citations omitted).
200
While Justice Ginsburg joined in the Samson decision, it is questionable whether she fully supports the
“conservative” block’s Fourth Amendment inclinations as described here.
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Much has been – and will be – written about the Supreme Court’s opening salvo against
the exclusionary rule in Hudson.201 However, a true accounting of the Roberts Court’s initial
forays into the broader Fourth Amendment realm cannot be had without accounting for Samson
as well. Taken together, a broader jurisprudence begins to appear in focus, and lessons for future
petitioners can be gleaned. In the crudest measure, the Roberts Court came down strongly in
favor of the government in its first term Fourth Amendment cases, four decisions to one. And as
to that one case decided against the government, Randolph, at least one commentator has
questioned the precedential force of the decision going forward given the majority opinion’s
narrow scope and the existing exceptions to the consent requirement.202 Going forward,
challenges to government action in the Fourth Amendment context will have a high hurdle to
overcome, because the presumption exists among at least five members of the Court that the
governmental interest in law enforcement (specifically crime prevention and evidence gathering)
will usually trump the individual interest in privacy. This “thumb on the scale” method of
constitutional adjudication de-emphasizes the individual’s right to a certain sphere of privacy,
autonomy, or dignity that cannot be (or at least should not be) constitutionally invaded without a
warrant. This government-preferred formulation will play a large role in the “next generation”
Fourth Amendment cases sure to come before the Roberts Court in the near future, each of which
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require the Court to balance an individual’s privacy interests with the government’s desire to
conduct searches or surveillance on less-than probable cause.203
Wrangling over these issues is not new; all of this is merely a recasting of the
ever-present “freedom versus security” argument that is, in a certain sense, the
fundamental issue of governance, politics, and law. Neither are these issues new in the
context of the Supreme Court’s Fourth Amendment/criminal procedure jurisprudence.
Much has been written about the Burger and Rehnquist Courts’ retrenchment of
Warren-era expansion of constitutional protections for criminals and the accused.204
What is most important at this juncture is that the Roberts Court, in just its first term,
has signaled clearly where it stands on the issue of personal autonomy and privacy when
those values conflict with law enforcement prerogatives. Justice Breyer had it half right
in Hudson when he said that “[t]he majority’s “substantial social costs” argument is an
argument against the Fourth Amendment’s exclusionary principle itself.”205 The truth is
more broad; the conservative block’s balancing test is an argument against a strong
Fourth Amendment in general. Whether this tilt will carry over into other areas of law,
both within the traditional Fourth Amendment sphere and without, remains to be seen.
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